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Abstract
Film distributors occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Cold openings
provide a natural field setting to test models of limited strategic thinking. In a set of 856 widely
released movies, cold opening produces a significant 15% increase in domestic box office revenue
(though not in foreign markets and DVD sales), consistent with the hypothesis that some moviego-
ers do not infer low quality from cold opening. Structural parameter estimates indicate 1–2 steps of
strategic thinking by moviegoers (comparable to experimental estimates). However, movie studios
appear to think moviegoers are sophisticated since only 7% of movies are opened cold.
1 Introduction
The hypothesis that economic agents can correctly infer what other agents know from their actions
is a central principle in analysis of games with information asymmetry. A contrasting view is
that strategic thinking can be limited by cognitive constraints. In this view, players with private
information can fool some of the people, some of the time, in contrast to the standard equilibrium
assumption that nobody is fooled.1
One class of models of limited strategic thinking assumes there is a ‘cognitive hierarchy’ (CH)
of levels of steps of thinking. Low-level players do not think strategically, and higher-level players
anticipate the behavior of lower-level players correctly. These models have been used to explain
experimental data from a wide variety of normal-form games.2 The many examples studied include
both games in which behavior deviates systematically from equilibrium and others in which be-
havior is surprisingly close to equilibrium even without learning or other equilibrating forces (e.g.,
O¨stling et al. 2007). The only applications of these theories to games with private information
so far are analyses of auctions.3 Another class of models, which apply on to private-information
games, are models of ‘cursed equilibrium.’ In these models agents ignore the possible link between
information and actions of other players to some degree (Eyster and Rabin, 2005).
Models of limited strategic thinking are particularly useful if the same basic principles can
apply to many different games, to field data, and to experimental data. This paper explores the
generality of these approaches through the first empirical comparison of the CH and cursed equi-
1See Crawford (2003).
2See Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wilson (1995), Camerer et al. (2004), Crawford and Iriberri (2007a).
3See Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) and Wang (2006).
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librium model in private-information games using field data.4 (Full rationality is also part of the
comparison since it is a limiting case of both the CH and cursed models.)
The setting is Hollywood. Movie distributors generally show movies to critics well in advance
of the release (so that critics’ reviews can be published or posted before the movie is shown, and
can be quoted in newspaper ads). However, movies are sometimes deliberately made unavailable
until after the initial release, a practice sometimes called “cold opening.” If moviegoers believe that
distributors know their movie’s quality (and if some other simplifying assumptions hold), we show
in the next section that rational moviegoers should infer that cold opened movies are below average
in quality. Anticipating this inference, distributors should only cold open the very worst movies.
However, this conclusion requires many steps of iterated reasoning (as well as many simplifying
assumptions). So it is an empirical question whether the equilibrium prediction holds. If it does
not hold perfectly, it is also an empirical question, whether neoclassical explanations can explain
the data or models of limited strategic thinking designed to explain experimental data can fit the
distributors’ cold opening decisions and the box office response.
This setting is one example of a more general class of disclosure games in which a seller
who knows something about a product’s quality can choose whether to disclose a signal of its
quality or not (see Verrecchia (2001, section 3) and Fishman and Hagerty (2003) for surveys). For
instance, a car salesman can signal a vehicle’s quality by adding a warranty (Grossman, 1981). A
4Two unpublished studies using field data and cognitive hierarchy approaches are O¨stling et al., (2007) using
Swedish lottery choices and experimental analogues, and Goldfarb and Yang (2007) using estimation of firm adoption
of 56K modems. The O¨stling et al. study compares QRE and cognitive hierarchy approaches but Goldfarb and Yang
do not compare to QRE, and neither paper estimates the cursed equilibrium model as we do since both are modeled as
complete information games.
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regulated firm can selectively report information about its industry to regulators (Milgrom, 1981).
Restaurants can voluntarily post health department ratings even if they aren’t required to by law
(Jin and Leslie, 2003). HMOs can choose whether to voluntarily disclose quality by submitting to
independent accreditation (Jin, 2005). A hedge fund can selectively report past earnings (Malkiel
and Saha, 2005). Online daters can decide whether to post a picture or not (Hitsch et al., 2006).
Sellers in online auctions can selectively disclose shipping charges (Brown et al., 2007). Colleges
can incentivize good (or bad) students to disclose (or not disclose) their SAT scores to US News
and World Report (Conlin et al., 2008). In politics and law, the analogous situation is when one can
choose to disclose the answer a direct question, or can avoid answering the question (e.g.,“pleading
the fifth” in legal settings).
For regulators, what consumers infer from non-disclosure is important for deciding whether
disclosure should be voluntary or mandatory. If consumers do not infer that nondisclosure is bad
news about quality, an economic argument can be made for mandatory disclosure under some
conditions. We return to this topic briefly in the conclusion.
1.1 Basic ideas
A fully rational analysis, due originally to Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), implies that
cold opening should not be profitable if some simple assumptions are met. The argument can
be illustrated numerically with a highly simplified example. Suppose movie quality is uniformly
distributed from 0 to 100, moviegoers and distributors agree on quality, and firm profits increase
in quality. If distributors cold open all movies with quality below a cutoff 50, moviegoers with
rational expectations will infer that the expected quality of a cold opened movie is 25. But then it
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would pay to screen all movies with qualities between 26 and 100, and only cold open movies with
qualities 25 or below. Generally, if the distributors do not screen movies with qualities below q∗,
the consumers’ conditional expectation if a movie if unscreened is q∗/2, so it pays to screen movies
with qualities q ∈ (q∗/2, 100] rather than quality below q∗. The logical conclusion of iterating this
reasoning is that only the worst movies (quality 0) are unscreened. This conclusion is sometimes
called “unravelling.”
Whether there is complete unraveling, in theory, is sensitive to some of the simplifying assump-
tions (see Milgrom 2008). If disclosure is costly (Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982), sellers will only
reveal information down to a certain threshold of low quality.5 In other cases, sellers may know
the quality of their own product with some probability (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988; Shin,
1994; Dye and Sridhar, 1995; Shin, 2003), or can only learn the quality at a cost (Matthews and
Postlewaite, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Shavell, 1994). Fishman and Hagerty (2003) assume a portion of
consumers are unable to interpret revealed information, but this does not necessarily lead to limited
disclosure.6
These conditions which may prevent unravelling do not characterize the movie business partic-
ularly well. The median production budget in our sample is $35 million, the marketing budgets are
often comparable in scale (50-100% of the production budget), but the costs of arranging screen-
ings for critics (or now, sending DVDs) is on the scale of thousands of dollars. Furthermore, sellers
usually know a lot about quality—as judged by likely moviegoers—because movies are almost al-
5Intuitively, even if low-quality movies below the threshold are pooled in with inferior movies, if disclosure is
costly then the penalty from being in the same pool is tolerable if it is below the cost of disclosing.
6They find three equilibria—one in which quality is always revealed, one in which it is never revealed, and one in
which high quality is revealed and low quality is not.
4
ways screened for test audiences, and learning about quality perceptions from these tests is not
costly. Therefore, we proceed with the maintained hypothesis that complete unravelling should
occur in theory, if distributors and consumers are perfectly rational.
What do models of limited strategic thinking predict? The cognitive hierarchy models proceed
through the steps of strategic thinking in the rational unravelling argument, except that they as-
sume that some fraction of moviegoers end their inference process after a small number of steps.
For example, a level-0 moviegoer thinks that cold opening decisions are random (they convey no
information about quality) and hence infers that the quality of a cold-opened movie is average.
A level-1 distributor anticipates that moviegoers think this way and therefore opens all below-
average movies cold, and shows all above-average movies to critics. Higher-level thinkers iterate
this process. Observed behavior will then be an average of the predicted behaviors at each of these
levels weighted by the fraction of moviegoers and distributors who do various numbers of steps of
thinking (More details of this model are given in section 4).
The model of cursed equilibrium is similar. It assumes that a fraction of moviegoers form the
correct conditional expectation of quality given a cold opening (i.e, those moviegoers act as if they
know precisely how distributors map quality into the decision about whether to cold open). The
remaining fraction believe—mistakenly—that cold opened movies are random in quality, neglect-
ing the link between distributors’ information about quality and their cold opening choice. Note
that full rationality is a special case of both models.
Industry executives and analysts who describe the cold opening decision often imply that lim-
ited moviegoer rationality justifies a cold opening, because they say that a bad review can hurt
more than a non-review does.7 For example, Greg Basser, CEO of Village Roadshow Entertain-
7Another explanation for cold opening is that the movie was not ready to be released to critics, or that the movie
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ment Group, told us, “If you screen [a bad movie] for critics all they can do is say something which
may prevent someone from going to the movie.” As Dennis Rice, the former Disney publicity chief
put it, “If we think screenings for the press will help open the movie, we’ll do it. If we don’t think
it’ll help... then it may make sense not to screen the movie,” (Germain, 2006). Litwak (1986) notes
“As a courtesy, and to ensure that reviews are ready by the time a film is released,
distributors arrange advance screenings for critics. However, if negative reviews are
expected, the distributor may decide not to screen a picture, hoping to delay the bad
news. (p. 241)”
The data we describe next show that 7% of the movies in our sample are opened cold (though
that fraction has increased sharply in recent years). Regressions show that cold opening appears
to generate a box office premium (compared to similar-quality movies that are pre-reviewed, and
including many other controls), which is consistent with the hypothesis that some consumers are
overestimating quality of movies that are opened cold. We apply several mechanical explanations,
but none can plausibly explain the findings.
We then fit the two parametric models of limited strategic thinking (described above) to both
moviegoer and distributor decisions. The models parameterize the degree of strategic thinking
by one parameter, so we can characterize the degree of limited rationality numerically (and also
contained a surprise that reviewers might spoil (e.g., “Sixth Sense”, “Cloverfield”, “Blair Witch Project”). In the first
case, it is very rare that a film uses this explanation for a cold opening, to our knowledge only one movie (“Doogal”) in
our dataset has made this claim (Germain, 2006). On the second item, “Sixth Sense”, “Cloverfield”, and “Blair Witch”
were all released to critics. None of the 59 movies that were cold opened in the data sample featured such intense plot
twists. Normally, such plot twists are an example of high-quality writing, something which the typical cold-opened
movie does not feature. See next section for a description of the quality of cold opened movies.
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compare the results to experimental estimates). The best-fitting CH model parameters suggest that
moviegoers are doing an average of 1.12 steps of thinking, which is lower but roughly compa-
rable to estimates from many experiments (1-2 steps). However, given the box office premium,
distributors should be opening many more movies cold. Within the restrictive structure of the CH
model, the only possible explanation is that distributors think moviegoers are more sophisticated
than they really are, so the distributors’ estimated average number of perceived thinking steps is
around 8. The mismatch between the degree of strategic thinking of moviegoers and distributors
is not typically observed in experimental data. However, keep in mind that experiments rarely use
mixtures of populations which are more and less strategically sophisticated, so it is perhaps not
surprising that the estimate of distributor strategic thinking is very high, and is much higher than
the moviegoer estimates.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the data we use on quality ratings,
box-office returns, and control variables, and presents some regression results on the existence
and robustness of a box-office premium for movies that are opened cold. Section 3 describes the
CH and cursed equilibrium models (including “quantal response equilibrium” (QRE), which is
a special case of the cursed model), and section 4 estimates parameters of those models based
on distributors’ decisions and the box office revenue. Section 5 concludes and discusses related
empirical results on disclosure effects, which are generally consistent with ours.
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2 Data
The data set is all 890 movies widely released8 in the U.S. in their first weekend, over the 61
2
year
period from January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2006.9
Critic and moviegoer ratings are both used to measure quality. Metacritic.com ratings are used
to measure critic ratings. Metacritic.com normalizes and averages ratings from over 30 movie
critics from newspapers, magazines, and websites. The metacritic rating is available for all non-
cold-opened movies on the day they are released and is available on Monday for cold opened
movies. We assume their ratings are generally exogenous from box office revenue measures.10
A natural question to ask is whether metacritic ratings accurately express the quality of movies
as perceived by moviegoers and revealed by demand. Our analysis indicates that they do for
example, our regressions (discussed later) show a very sharp correlation between critic ratings and
box office revenues. This result is also found in other studies of critic influence (Eliashberg and
Shugan, 1997; Reinstein and Snyder, 2005).
We also examine the aggregated user ratings on imdb.com, which is the largest internet site
for user movie reviews. There is a high correlation (.76) between metacritic scores and imdb user
reviews (see Figure 1). The high correlation between critic (metacritic) and the moviegoer (IMDB
8Attention is restricted to movies initially released in over 300 theaters. Movies in more limited release have much
less box office impact (they are usually art house movies that use a platform strategy of starting on a few screens, then
expanding). It is also likely that information about quality leaks out more rapidly for these movies if they later go into
wide release, even when they are initially opened cold.
9Movies before 2000 are excluded because Metacritic.com’s records did not cover every movie from before 2000.
10Ratings such as the imdb.com user rating are determined by the people who see the movie and who give reviews
afterwards. We treat that variable as a measure of popularity, but consider it endogenous to box office.
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of metacritic.com quality ratings and imdb user ratings
ratings) holds across movie to genres (see Table 4 below). Metacritic scores therefore correlate
with two clear indicators of movie popularity (imdb and box office).11
The squares in Figure 1 represent the cold opened movies in our sample. No cold opened movie
has a metacritic rating higher than 55, and the average rating for those movies (the total sample
11We are assuming that critic reviews influence moviegoers. Alternatively, critics might correlate with overall
popularity (as our previous evidence suggests), but moviegoers ignore them so they have predictive, but not influencing
power. Survey evidence suggests one third of moviegoers use critical reviews to make decisions (Simmons, 1994).
But the empirical work of Eliashberg and Shugan (1997) finds it impossible to reach a definitive conclusion on this
issue, and Reinstein and Snyder (2005) find evidence that critic ratings only matter for specific genres. However, the
latter study only examines the effect of two critics (i.e., Siskel and Ebert) delaying their review. A cold opening delays
all reviews and thus might have a greater effect across genres. Because this evidence is somewhat inconclusive, we
will use several different tests to check our hypothesis that it is indeed the cold opening increasing box office and thus
the critic reviews (or lack thereof) influencing moviegoers.
9
Table 1: Summary statistics for variables (N = 890 except N = 856 for production budget).
average is 48) is 25.
Cold opening, box office revenues, movie genres and ratings, production budgets, and star
power ratings are collected from various data sources (see Appendix A for more details). Table 1
provides summary statistics for all variables. All these variables were used in a regression model
to test if movies that are cold opened have significantly greater opening weekend and total US box
office.
Each movie, j, has a metacritic.com rating, qj , a dummy variable for whether a movie was cold
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opened, cj (=1 if cold), and a vector Xj of other variables. The regression model is
log yj = aXj + bqj + dcj + j (1)
where yj is logged opening weekend or total US box office for movie j in 2003 dollars, standard-
ized using the GDP deflator (www.bea.gov). Table 2 shows the regression results.
The point of this initial regression is not to estimate a full model with endogenous distributor
decisions (that will be done in Sections 3 and 4). Instead, the regression is simply a way of
determining whether there is a difference in the revenue between cold opened and screened movies.
Under the standard equilibrium assumption that all quality information of cold opened movies is
inferred by logical inference of moviegoers, we should see no difference in revenues, and the cold
coefficient should be zero.12
The “cold” coefficient in the first row of Table 2 shows that cold opening a movie is positively
correlated with the logarithm of opening weekend and total US box office (see Appendix B, Table
A.1 for a similar result with opening day data).13 These coefficients suggest that cold opening a
movie increases revenue about 15%.14, 15 These effects persist when “lean” regressions are run with
12Alternatively, a switching regression model (similar to Borjas, 1987) for the choice to cold opened could be used
to capture the cold opening premium and characterize the decision to cold open. We have instead chosen to describe
the industry through a quantal response model (see Section 4)
13Note that this relationship is also found between cold opening and opening weekend and total US box office (no
logarithm). So this relationship is not just a result of the functional form of the regression.
14For the average gross of a cold opened movie, $20 million, this is roughly $3 million of box office revenue.
15These results do not change using imdb.com user ratings instead of metacritic ratings (although the imdb regres-
sion may include some endogeneity influence of box office buzz on imdb ratings).
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Table 2: Regressions of log box office revenues (in millions)
12
only the most significant variables included (i.e., cold, metacritic, theaters, budget, competition,
star ranking, sequel or adaptation dummy, and year of release). The lean regressions show a more
significant effect for opening weekend, than the effect for total box office, presumably because
critic reviews of cold opened movies are normally available by the Monday after the opening
weekend and they influence toal box office.16 The coefficients also suggest that cold opening
increases movie revenue by roughly the same amount as in the full regressions (14–17%).17
The regression coefficients in Table 2 are generally sensible. Higher quality leads to higher
box office—an increase in one metacritic point increases revenues by 2.1%. An extra $10 million
in production budget is correlated with a 3% increase in revenues. The number of theaters opened,
which often indicate expectations about movie revenues, have a very large effect.18 An increase of
1000 theaters increases revenue by 86%. The averaged logged star power rankings have a negative
16It is somewhat surprising that the effect of a cold opening continues after the first weekend when critical reviews
are available. Intuitively, the cold opening effect should occur during the first weekend and then dissipate rapidly as
moviegoers learn the true quality of a cold opened movie. An alternative explanation is that moviegoers infer quality
from the first weekend’s revenue (see De Vany and Walls (1996) for a model with such dynamics). Then the perceived
“effect” of a cold opening on post-first-weekend box office includes a secondary result from cold opening affecting
the first weekend’s box office (as in models of herd behavior or cascades). The data agree with this assessment; if we
run a regression on logged box office revenues after the first weekend (see Table A.2), including logged first weekend
with our other independent variables, then we find cold has an slightly negative effect (−3%, p ≈ 0.5; −10%, p < 0.1
(lean)) on post-opening-weekend revenue, and a opening weekend is correlated with post-opening-weekend revenue
(120%, p < 0.01).
17The p-values on all the cold opening coefficients are based upon one-tailed tests because the hypothesis is that
cold opening either increases revenue or has no effect.
18Theaters may be a proxy for the omitted variable of advertising budget as well, which magnifies the theater
variable effect.
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correlation (higher numbers indicate lower rankings and less revenue). Adaptations and sequels
increase box office by roughly 13%, a result which may explain the recent growth in the fraction
of movies in this category.
2.1 Alternative Explanations of the Cold Opening Premium
The central premise of this paper is that limited strategic thinking causes moviegoers to overvalue
the quality of cold opened movies that are of below average quality, which is one possible expla-
nation for why cold opened movies have a higher relative box office to similar movies that were
screened for critics. The previous section finds evidence for that higher box office, but there may
be other reasons for the observed premium. This section explores such possibilities and reports
evidence against most of these explanations.
One apparent alternative explanation is that not everyone knows whether movies have been
cold opened (e.g., it may be costly to find out19). Consumers who do not know whether movies
were reviewed or not could believe the cold-opened movies have average quality (because they
don’t know they were unreviewed) and would therefore go to those movies more often than if they
made the correct strategic inference.20
However, missing information about cold openings in this way simply means that some movie-
goers have missing information about all critic reviews. Missing information biases the regression
coefficient on critic-rated quality toward zero, but does not bias revenues of cold-opened movies
19In the conventional sense, it is not actually ”costly” to find out about cold openings. Daily newspapers cost $1 or
less; if there is no review on the day of opening (almost always Friday) then the movie is cold opened.
20This example is very similar to having a moviegoers’ curse for all movies rather than just the cold opened ones.
See section 4.1 for an explanation of the cursed equilibrium model and footnote 35 for more detail.
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upward. The reason is that missing information creates an upward bias for all low-quality movies
(compared to full information), but does not create a differential effect for low-quality movies
which were cold opened compared to low-quality movies which were not cold-opened. That is,
uninformed moviegoers would overvalue all movies of below average quality, including those
which were not opened cold, and would undervalue all movies of above average quality as well.
Ignoring critic information should produce a general ”below-average-quality” premium (compared
to full information) but will not create a cold-opening premium per se.
Other explanations are therefore more plausible as conceivable explanations of a cold opening
premium. It is possible that cold opened movies have some characteristic omitted from the Table
2 regressions that causes these movies to generate apparently greater box office (a classic omitted
variable bias). In this case, our regressions are not capturing the effect of cold opening, but are
capturing the effect of an omitted variable that is correlated with cold opening.
However, all the obvious measurable controls are already included in Table 2. (Appendix B,
Table A.3 also shows all correlations and indicates that cold opening is not strongly correlated with
any variable except quality.) Since all obvious measurable controls are included, the most likely
omitted variable that could be correlated with the decision to cold open is spending on publicity and
advertising.21 Omitting this variable would explain the cold opening premium if revenues increase
with spending on advertising, and if advance screening and advertising are substitutes (i.e., if dis-
tributors spend more on ads to compensate for cold opening but ad spending is an omitted variable).
In our data cold openings are associated with a 10% drop in advertising, however.22 Furthermore,
21Unfortunately, we found advertising budgets for only 445 of the 856 movies in our sample, and only 12 of the 59
cold openings.
22The result is only based on 12 cold openings and is not significant (p≈ 0.3; lean regression p ≈ 0.23).
15
a senior executive at Fox distributors we interviewed contradicted this notion, suggesting that if
anything distributors are tighter with their spending on advertising once the decision to cold-open
is made (which happens late in the process, after the number of screens and most other variables
have been determined). The executive’s view was that distributors know cold-opened movies are
not very good, and see high levels of ad spending on such movies as throwing good money after
a bad movie. The industry also appears to typically set advertising budgets as a fixed proportion
of production budgets (Vogel (2007) suggests one-half, an executive at Village Roadshow told us
two-thirds). If these rules of thumb are true, then the production budget variable will pick up much
of the omitted effect of dvertising on the cold opening decision, even if there is any.23
Another possible problem is that annoyed critics may give cold-opened movies lower critical
ratings than they would have if the movies were screened in advance (perhaps as a way of punishing
the distributors for making the movie unavailable).24 This explanation seems unlikely since critics
pride themselves on objectivity (for example, they rarely mention in late reviews of cold opened
movies that the movie was unavailable in advance).25 The fact that the cold opening premium on
revenues is evident even when imdb user ratings are used instead of metacritic quality ratings also
23A regression of production budget on marketing budget, for the 445 movies that we have both types of budget
data, has R2 = 0.496, indicating advertising budgets are highly correlated with production budgets.
24Litwak (1986) mentions this idea when describing a cold opening.
25On their TV movie-review show Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper introduced the “Wagging Finger of Shame”
awarded to cold opened movies. However, they did not do this to convey negative opinions about particular movies;
they did it because they thought that shaming some movies would discourage the practice in general. They discontin-
ued the ‘award’ when they felt it was not working (Germain, 2006). In one case, Roeper gave a cold-opened movie
(“When a Stranger Calls”) his video recommendation, a recommendation he would not have made if he was intent on
being overly negative simply because a movie was cold-opened.
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rules out this hypothesis.
One way to test for an omitted-variable bias is to look at the log total box office of the U.K.
and Mexico, and log of US video rental data. In these markets, the possible deception of cold
opening on strategically naı¨ve moviegoers should be less effective because movies are almost
always released in the U.K. and Mexico after the initial U.S. release, and home video rentals are
always later than U.S. box office releases. If information about the movie’s quality is widely
disseminated before these later releases, the cold opening effect should disappear in foreign and
rental markets.
Table 3 reports the cold-opening coefficients (from a regression including all variables as in
Table 2). There is apparently no cold opening premium in these two foreign markets and the rental
markets. These results work against the hypothesis that the premium is due to an omitted-variable
bias and is consistent with the hypothesis that some moviegoers are fooled by cold openings before
information leaks out.26
Another way to check whether cold opened movies have any inherent differences in sensitivity
to critic ratings is to examine the movies by genre. Comedies and suspense/horror movies account
for 80% of cold openings, but only 54% of all movies (see Table 4). If fans of these genres have
26Another explanation is that moviegoers of cold-opened movies are less sensitive to critic reviews. Then the high
turnouts for cold-opened movies have nothing to do with the opening, but just the fact that given identically low critic
reviews, cold-opened movies turn out more viewers. This explanation may appear appealing as the correlation of
critic reviews and user reviews for cold-opened movies while high (0.51) is much lower than the correlation of critic
reviews and user reviews of non-cold opened movies (0.76). However, this relationship likely results from the fact that
cold-opened movies create a smaller range of critic ratings (x¯ ≈ 25, s2 ≈ 11). If we restrict non-cold opened movies
to those with critic ratings under 40 (x¯ ≈ 29, s2 ≈ 8) or above 60 (x¯ ≈ 70, s2 ≈ 7), we find similar values for the
correlation (0.51 and 0.53, respectively).
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Table 3: The cold opening percentage premium (regression coefficient) in non-US box office mar-
kets (control variables included, but results not reported).
Table 4: Data separated by movie genre
less sensitivity to bad reviews (suggested by Reinstein and Snyder, 2005), and are more likely to
go to a movie that has low critic ratings than fans of other genres, then the cold opening premium
could be a result of the selection of cold-opened movies into these genres.27
Table 4 shows that this is not the case. Throughout genres, moviegoers’ correlation between
critic reviews and self-reported reviews are all around 0.75. The cold open premium is positive for
all genres (6–21%) except for the genre “animated” which is driven by a single movie, “Doogal.”
The cold opening premium is, apparently, not genre-specific.
Finally, our hypothesis is that limited iterated strategic thinking causes some moviegoers to be
27This explanation would not explain why distributors would be more likely to withhold bad news in genres where
the intended audience is the least receptive to bad news.
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“tricked,” overestimating the ex-ante quality of cold opened movies. These should be lower user
reviews for cold-opened movies, holding everything else constant. Using imdb.com user data and
the usual table 2 independent variables, we find that cold opened movies have an average rating 0.4
points (out of 10) lower than non-cold opened movies. The result is highly significant (p < 0.001).
In the next section we will develop two structural models of strategic thinking by moviegoers
and distributors and estimate behavioral parameters which measure the degree of limited strate-
gic thinking for both groups. If some of these models can successfully explain the cold opening
premium with similar parameter values to what has been observed in other studies, that result is
another piece of evidence that the premium is not due to an omitted variable, but instead reflects
some limit on strategic thinking.
3 The General Model
In designing a model of movie viewing and distributor choice, the aim is to create a model that
can be analyzed with box office data, but allows estimation of behavioral parameters of individual
thinking. The model permits both distributors and moviegoers to be influenced by the choice and
cognition of the other side. Recall that the initial regressions in Section 2 were not designed to un-
derstand the endogenous choice of distributors to cold open, and the likely reactions of moviegoers,
but these behavioral models are.
To fix notation, assume that the distributor of movie j and moviegoers both know movie char-
acteristics Xj . The game form is simple: Distributors observe qj and then choose whether to open
cold (cj = 1) or to screen for critics in advance (cj = 0). Moviegoers form a belief Em(qj|cj, Xj)
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about a movie that depends on its characteristics Xj and whether it was cold opened cj .28 Below
we consider two models of belief formation which incorporate different types of limits on strategic
thinking. Both include fully rational equilibrium as limiting cases.
The first assumption is that if a movie is screened to critics, its quality is then known to movie-
goers. Quality could be known with noise and all results go through if moviegoers are risk-neutral:
Assumption 1. Em[qj|0, Xj] = qj.
To model moviegoing and distributor decisions jointly, we use a quantal response approach in
which moviegoers and distributors choose stochastically according to either utilities or expected
profits. Since we have no data on individual choices or demographic market-segment data, we use
a representative-agent approach to model moviegoers. Assumption 2 is that moviegoer utility is
linear in movie characteristics and expected quality, subtracting the ticket price.
Assumption 2. U(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = αEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βXj − tˆ+ j
where α and β give the corresponding predictive utility associated with expected quality and other
known characteristics of movies. The opportunity utility of not going to the movies is defined as
zero.29 In the quantal response approach, probabilities of making choices depend on their relative
utilities. We use a logit specification (e.g., McFadden, 1974). The probability that the representa-
28It is not crucial that moviegoers literally know whether a movie has been cold-opened or not (e.g., surveys are
likely to show that many moviegoers do not know). The essential assumption for analysis is that beliefs are approxi-
mately accurate for pre-reviewed movies and formed based on some different behavioral assumption for cold-opened
movies.
29This is without loss of generality because a constant term is included in the revenue regression, which in this
model is equivalent to the estimated utility of not going to the movie.
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tive moviegoer will go to movie j with characteristics Xj and expected quality Em(qj|cj, Xj), at
ticket price tˆ30 is
p(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = 1
1 + e−λm(αEm(qj |cj ,Xj)+βXj−tˆ+j)
(2)
where λm is the sensitivity of responses to utility. Higher values of λm imply that the higher-utility
choice is made more often. At λm = 0, choices are random.31 As λm → ∞, the probability of
choosing the option with the highest utility converges to one (best-response).32
Expected box-office revenues are assumed to equal the probability of attendance by a represen-
tative moviegoer, times the population sizeN and ticket price tˆ, which yieldsR(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) =
Ntˆp(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)). Note that the distributor’s choice of cj is assumed to enter the revenue
30The term tˆ is the average US ticket price in midyear 2003 (recall box office revenues are in 2003 dollars). For
an explanation of why movie ticket prices are not different for different movies see Orbach and Einav (2007) or for a
more general explanation, Barro and Romer (1987).
31This model implies that if λm = 0, the representative moviegoer will attend each movie in its first weekend
with .5 probability. While that result may be unappealing, note that a multinomial specification (i.e, if λm = 0,
the representative moviegoer will go to the movies with .5 probability and which movie he goes to will depend on
its underlying characteristics) would be much more complicated to calculate and also has unappealing results. For
instance, movies that open alone each weekend should have much higher box office than those that open when three
other movies do (which is generally not true).
Additionally, this point is moot. The later λm estimates will be far from 0 (see Table A.4). As it turns out when one
looks at equation 6, it is apparent that it would require on average movies to make roughly $800 million in their first
weekend to push λˆm to 0 (because that parameter value suggests half the US population sees the movie). Instead this
value can be thought of as an upper bound on movie revenue and a lower bound on rationality.
32See Luce and Raiffa (1957), Chen et al. (1997), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998).
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equation solely through its effect on moviegoer expectations of quality Em(qj|cj, Xj).
The distributor’s decision to screen the movie (cj = 0) or open it cold (cj = 1) is also modeled
by a stochastic choice function based on a comparison of expected profits from the two decisions.
Given assumption 1, the revenue from screening is R(Xj, qj) and the revenue from cold opening is
R(Xj, Em(qj|1, Xj)). Given the same logit choice specification as for moviegoers, the probability
of a distributor opening the movie cold is therefore given by assumption 3,
Assumption 3. pi(Xj, qj) = 1/ (1 + exp [−λd [R(Xj, Em(qj|1, Xj))−R(Xj, qj)]])
where λd is the sensitivity of distributor responses to expected revenue.33
The logic of the model and our data (see Section 2 and Table 2) suggest that cold opening most
strongly affects the first weekend’s revenue (which may then affect cumulative revenue). There-
fore, we use the first weekend’s revenue to calibrate the models’ revenue equations and distributor
decisions in the next section. Our probability and utility functions given in assumption 2 and
equation 2 are based on the moviegoers’ behavior in the first weekend.34
4 Two Behavioral Models of Limited Strategic Thinking
The crucial behavioral questions are what moviegoers believe about the quality of a movie that is
cold-opened—i.e., what is Em(qj|1, Xj)?—and how those expected beliefs influence the distribu-
33In many previous applications of these games to experimental datasets the response sensitivity parameters λ are
the same since game payoffs are on similar payoff scales. We use two separate parameters here for moviegoers and
distributors, λm and λd, because the payoffs are on the order of dollar-scale utilities for moviegoers and millions of
dollars for distributors.
34Results are similar when total box office is used.
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tor’s probability of choosing a cold opening, which is pi(Xj, qj).
This section compares two models of beliefs: Cursed equilibrium (Section 4.1), and cognitive
hierarchy (Section 4.2). Each model requires that moviegoers and distributors optimize (stochasti-
cally) based on their belief about the other’s actions, but those beliefs might be limited in strategic
sophistication. In this way the model allows the decision of distributors to cold open to be en-
dogenously related to moviegoers’ attendance of cold opened movies, which is in turn driven by
moviegoers’ beliefs about what cold opening implies about quality. This structure represents an
improvement on the initial regressions in Section 2), and is a tool for gauging how well behavioral
models developed to explain experimental data may work in a field setting.
In cursed equilibrium (Section 4.1), moviegoers’ beliefs about the quality of a cold-opened
movie are a weighted average of unconditional overall average quality (with weight χ) and the
rationally-expected quality that fully anticipates distributors’ decisions (with weight 1− χ).35 The
35 It is tempting to interpret χ as a fraction of people who are uninformed about reviews because finding out about
reviews is costly (as discussed in section 2.1). This interpretation is not tested by our empirical procedure, because we
use the empirical quality-revenue relation for reviewed (i.e., non-cold-opened) movies as an input to then estimate χ.
A proper implementation of the theory that some moviegoers don’t find out anything about reviews requires inclusion
of a parameter measuring the fraction of uninformed moviegoers, which influences both the quality-revenue equation
for reviewed movies, and the estimated value of χ (which will mistakenly include that fraction). Such a model is not
well-identified without more information of how informed moviegoers are or how many are not thinking strategically,
which might be measured directly in surveys or methods to classify people into types. However, in our specific
structural framework, box office revenues are not linear in expected beliefs (through assumption 2). So a model in
which there are a fraction χ of people who use average quality for cold-opened movies, and a fraction 1−χ who form
rational expectations is not exactly equivalent. (The difference is that between a nonlinear probability function of a
weighted average and a weighted average of nonlinear probabilities.)
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parameter χ is a measure of the degree of naı¨vete´ in the moviegoers’ strategic thinking (i.e., to
what extent beliefs about cold-opened movies are biased toward average quality).
In the cognitive hierarchy (CH) approach (Section 4.2), there is a hierarchy of levels of strategic
thinking. The lowest-level thinkers do not think strategically at all, and higher-level thinkers best-
respond to correctly anticipated choices of lower-level thinkers. For parsimony, the percentages
of players at different levels in the cognitive hierarchy are characterized by a Poisson distribution
with mean thinking-level parameter τ .
Importantly, both models allow full rationality as a limiting case of their behavioral parameters.
Full rationality corresponds to χ = 0 in cursed equilibrium and τ → ∞ in CH. In the former
case, full rationality corresponds to a quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995,
1998). Therefore, estimates derived from the data will indicate the degree of moviegoer rationality
as parameterized in these two ways.
4.1 Cursed Equilibrium
Eyster and Rabin (2005) created a model of “cursed equilibrium” to explain stylized facts like the
winner’s curse in auctions, and other situations where some agents do not seem to infer the private
information of other players from those players’ actions. Their idea is that such an incomplete
inference is consistent with agents not appreciating the degree to which other players’ actions are
conditioned on information.36
In this context, for every cold opened movie, all moviegoers believe that the movie has quality
36 An alternative to the cursed equilibrium model, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium model (Jehiel, 2005;
Jehiel and Koessler, 2008) can also model partial sophistication from an equilibrium viewpoint. Because that model
is less parsimonious than the cursed equilibrium model, it will not be used in this paper’s analysis.
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equal to some weighted average of the rational expectation of movie quality (given distributor
decisions) and the average of all movies (i.e., ignoring any information conveyed by the cold
opening decision). That is,
Ecem(qj|1) ≡ (1− χm)Erem (q|Xj, 1) + χmq¯ (3)
where Erem (q|Xj, 1) reflects rational expectations about distributor decisions.
The rational expectation belief, Erem (qj|1, Xj), about the quality of an unscreened movie with
characteristics Xj is
Erem (qj|1, Xj) =
∑100
q=0 qP (q|Xj, 1)
=
P100
q=0 qP (1,Xj ,q)
P (1,Xj)
(Bayes’ rule)
=
P100
q=0 qP (1,Xj ,q)P100
q=0 P (1,Xj ,q)
(laws of probability)
=
P100
q=0 qP (1|Xj ,q)P (Xj ,q)P100
q=0 P (1|Xj ,q)P (Xj ,q)
(laws of probability)
=
P100
q=0 qP (1|Xj ,q)P (Xj)P (q)P100
q=0 P (1|Xj ,q)P (Xj)P (q)
(independence assumption)
=
P100
q=0 qpi(Xj ,q)P (q)P100
q=0 pi(Xj ,q)P (q)
(definition in (A3)).
(4)
Intuitively, for agents to form an expectation about the quality of a cold opened movieErem (qj|1, Xj),
they must consider all possible levels of quality that a movie could have (hence the summations
over all integers in [0,100]), and the conditional probability that the movie would be of the hy-
pothesized quality given its characteristics and the fact that a distributor decided to cold open it
with probability P (q|1, Xj) (which is equal to pi(q|1, Xj), the actual probability). This derivation
uses the laws of probability, and the crucial assumption that the probability of any movie’s quality
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level, P (q), is independent from the probability of it having any other characteristics (P (Xj)),37
then a cold opened movie’s expected quality, Eqrem (qj|1, Xj), only depends on the joint probability
of a distributor cold opening a movie with given characteristics and quality (pi (Xj, q)), and the
frequency of quality ratings (P (q)). Independence is a helpful simplification because without it,
distributor decisions would depend on quality and on the entire vector of characteristics, which
creates too many decision probabilities to estimate reliably. From this transformation we are able
to calculate Eqrem (qj|1, Xj) if pi (Xj, q) is known.
The cold opening probabilities pi(Xj, q) depend on estimated revenues from opening the movie
cold or screening it (and revealing its quality, assuming (A1)). We use a transformation, then
regression, to estimate the revenue as a function of Xj and q. The revenue equation (defined in
previous section) is
R(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = Ntˆp(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj))
= Ntˆ/
[
1 + e−λm(αEm(qj |cj ,Xj)+βXj−tˆ+j)
]
. (5)
Rearranging terms and taking a logarithm, yields a specification which is easy to estimate because
it is linear in characteristics Xj and expected quality Em(qj|cj, Xj),
log
(
R(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj))
Ntˆ−R(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj))
)
= −λm
(
αEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βXj − tˆ+ j
)
. (6)
37Appendix B, Table A.3 shows the intercorrelation matrix. There is only one variable which has a correlation with
quality higher than .20—namely, the budget (r = .28). Therefore, the assumption of independence in (3) is not a bad
approximation.
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Note that this rational expectation computation is recursive: Moviegoers’ beliefs about the quality
of cold opened movies depend on which movies the distributors choose to cold open (through
equation 4). But the distributors’ choice to cold open depends on moviegoers’ beliefs about the
quality of cold opened movies (through assumption 3).
Because of this recursive structure, we estimate the model using an iterative procedure (see
Appendix C for details). The procedure first uses the large number of screened movies (where
quality is assumed to be known to moviegoers by (1)) to estimate regression parameters that fore-
cast revenues conditional on quality in (6). Then movie-specific expected qualities for all cold
opened movies are imputed using a maximum-likelihood procedure that chooses a distributor re-
sponse sensitivity λd which explains actual distributor decisions best and satisfies the assumption
that moviegoers’ beliefs are a χ-weighted mixture of rational expectations and naive beliefs (equa-
tion 6). These inferred expected qualities are then added to qualities of all movies to re-estimate (6)
and the process iterates until parameters converge. Convergence means that parameters have been
found such that both the representative moviegoer and the distributors best-respond (stochastically)
and the moviegoer rational-expectations constraint on cold-opened movies (4) is satisfied.
To find the best-fitting χ, the procedure is repeated using a grid-search over values between 0
and 1, and the best-fitting χ is found (using a maximum likelihood criterion over all distributors’
release decisions). That is, given the 856 (797 screened, 59 cold) release decisions in our dataset, if
distributors were best responding to the a curse of moviegoers (knowing moviegoers characteristics
for movies and quantal response parameter λm), the maximum likelihood value of that curse is χ∗.
Our best fitting value is χ∗ = 0, largely because this value is based on distributors decisions.
This is the model’s only way of accounting for the two stylized facts– viz., (i) there are few cold
openings, but (ii) there is a substantial box office premium. Within the restricted structure of the
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model, the paucity of cold openings implies χd is low (i.e., distributors think moviegoers, have
little curse, and hence will believe cold-opened movies are terrible, which is why they open cold
so rarely). Given that estimate, the rational expectation of cold-opened movie quality is very low,
so to explain the box office premium the weight on the rational expectation term must be low. Note
that this is the same as fitting quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998).
Table A.4 shows the regression results from six iterations from this process (which stopped
according to the step 6 convergence definition in Appendix C). The r-squared value, 0.682, shows
our model has a reasonable fit with the data. The final log likelihood value, −205.7 implies that
the (geometric) meancorrectly-predicted probability of actual decisions for all movies is 0.79. This
predicted probability is much better than chance guessing (0.5) but is only a little better than simply
guessing that all movies have a cold opening probability equal to the 7% (= 59/856) base rate,
which yields a log-likelihood value of −211.62, and a mean correctly predicted probability 0.78.
Standard error estimates, determined by 100 bootstraps of this process, are shown in Table 8 and
will be discussed in Section 4.3.
After calculating χ∗ = 0, we calculated an additional parameter for moviegoers, χm, given the
quantal response parameters λm, λd and χ∗, based on cold opened movies’ first weekend revenues.
The best-fitting value is χ̂m = .922,38 indicating a high degree of curse (recall that χm = 0 is no
curse). That is, since the estimated correct expectation Erem (q|Xj, 1) for cold opened movies is low
(Em (q|1)= 25), and average overall quality is much higher (q¯ = 48) the representative moviegoer
is cursed in believing that quality of a cold opened movie is roughly 46 (=48χ̂m + 25(1 − χ̂m)),
38We feel the parameter χ∗ = 0 is the true estimate from the cursed equilibrium model. If we began the iterative
process with χ∗ = 0 it would converge with χ∗ = 0, if we began the process with χ∗ = 0.922 it would converge with
χ∗ = 0.
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much closer to the average quality of all movies than the actual average quality of cold-opened
movies. Cursed moviegoers vastly overestimate the quality of movies that are opened cold.
Since box-office revenues are increasing in quality, the fact that cursed moviegoers overesti-
mate the quality of cold opened movies is consistent with the box office premium found in the
basic regressions in Section 2. Indeed, the best-fitting cursed parameter estimate given the expec-
tations found in the previous model, of χˆm1 = .922, predicts an average log box office premium
on weekend box office of 0.33 (an increase in revenue of 33%). This value is considerably higher
than 15% estimate determined from our initial regression—i.e., it appears that the model implies
too little rationality of moviegoers, and too large a box office premium compared to the revenue
effect from regression (see Appendix B for more detail). However, the curse estimate is close to
the value (χ = .8) estimated by Eyster and Rabin on experimental data from Forsythe et al. (1989)
on agents’ “blind bidding” for objects of unknown value.
4.2 A Cognitive Hierarchy Model
Cognitive hierarchy or level-k models assume the population is composed of individuals that do
different numbers of steps of iterative strategic thinking. The lowest level (0-level) thinkers behave
heuristically (perhaps randomly) and k level thinkers optimize against k− 1 type thinkers.39 Zero-
level thinkers, such as moviegoers, do not think about the distributor’s actions of cold opening a
movie. For any cold-opened movie they infer the movie’s quality E0m(qj|Xj, 1) at random40 by
39This classification differs from some other versions of the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) which
suggests k level thinkers optimizes against a distribution of 0,1,...k − 1 level thinkers.
40In many games, assuming that 0-level players choose randomly across possible strategies is a natural starting
point. However, the more general interpretation is that 0-level players are simple, or heuristic, rather than random. For
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selecting any integer on [0,100] with equal probability. They will go to any movie with probability
defined as an analogue of equation (2)
p0
(
Xj, E
0
m(qj|cj, Xj)
)
=
100∑
q=0
(1/101)
1
1 + e−λm(βXj+αq−tˆ+j)
(7)
whereE0m(qj|cj, Xj) ∼ U [0, 100]. Similarly, a 0-level distributor will cold open movies at random,
that is,
pi0(qj, Xj) = 1/2. (8)
A 1-level moviegoer knows 0-level distributors cold open movies at random, and assumes all
distributors behave in this manner. For each movie he calculates the expected quality given it
has been cold opened as
E1m (q|Xj, 1) =
∑100
q=0 qP (q) pi0 (q,Xj)∑100
q=0 P (q) pi0 (q,Xj)
=
∑100
q=0 qP (q)
1
2∑100
q=0 P (q)
1
2
= q¯. (9)
example, in “hide-and-seek” games a natural starting point is to choose a “focal” strategy (see Crawford and Iriberri
(2007a)). In our game, random choice by moviegoers would mean random attendance at movies. That specification
of 0-level play doesn’t work well because it generates far too much box office revenue. Another candidate for 0-level
moviegoer play is to assume a cold-opened movie has sample-mean quality q¯. For technical reasons, that does not
work well either. It is admittedly not ideal to have special ad hoc assumptions for different games. Eventually we hope
there is some theory of 0-level play that maps the game structure and a concept of simplicity or heuristic behavior into
0-level specifications in a parsimonious way.
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A 1-level distributor expects all moviegoers to behave like 0-level moviegoers. They will assign
quality ratings to cold-opened movies at random from the uniform U [0, 100] distribution. The
1-level distributor will therefore cold-open movie j with probability
pi1(qj, Xj) = 1/
(
1 + exp
[
λd(
100∑
q=0
(1/101)R(Xj, q)−R(Xj, qj))
])
. (10)
Proceeding inductively, for any strategic level k, the values Ek−1m (q|1, Xj) and pik−1(qj, Xj)
are computed from response to k-1 level type beliefs and actions. The k-level distributor and
moviegoer have probabilities and beliefs
pik(qj, Xj) = 1/ (1 + exp [λm(R(Xj, Ek−1(q|Xj, 1))−R(Xj, qj))]) (11)
and
Ek(q|Xj, 1) =
∑100
q=0 qP (q)pik−1 (q,Xj)∑100
q=0 P (q) pik−1 (q,Xj)
(12)
which leads to moviegoing probability
pk
(
Xj, E
k
m(qj|cj, Xj)
)
=
1
1 + e−λm(βXj+αE
k
m(qj |cj ,Xj)−tˆ+j)
(13)
where every level-k distributor and moviegoer is playing a quantal response to the level-k-1 movie-
goer and distributor respectively.
As an example, Table 5 shows moviegoer-inferred quality and distributor probability of cold
opening for the movie When a Stranger Calls, for various levels of thinking and their proportions
within the population with λd = 7.085 (a figure estimated from the data, see Table A.5).
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Table 5: Expected quality of When a Stranger Calls (q = 27) given it is cold opened by level-k
moviegoer and probability it is cold opened by level-k distributor in CH with QR model (λd =
7.085).
Notice that a 0-level distributor cold opens movies at random. Thus a 1-level moviegoer, opti-
mizing against such distributor, believes that cold opened movies have quality (48.12), the average
quality of all movies (see equation 9). Then a 2-level distributor, knows that a 1-level moviegoer’s
belief in cold opened quality is much higher than actuality (q = 27). Since quality is preferred
by moviegoers, such distributor is very likely to cold open the movie (he will only release it given
a quantal response tremble, which depends on the other characteristics of the movie (Xj)). The
same can be said for for all level 1–5 distributors. However if a moviegoer is level 5 or above,
he believes a cold opened movie has lower quality than 27, thus distributors who optimize against
such moviegoers (levels 6+) are unlikely to cold open a movie of quality 27.
The cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004), based on lots of structurally differ-
ent experimental games, suggests that the proportion of thinkers in the population is often well
approximated by a one-parameter Poisson distribution with mean τ ,
P (x = n|τ) = τne−τ/n!, (14)
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where τ is the average number of steps of strategic thinking.41
Since the cognitive hierarchy model is only a partial equilibrium model (i.e., only the highest
types have accurate beliefs), it is sensible to the average level of distributor and moviegoer thinking
to differ. For this reason we will define two separate τ parameters: τm will be the mean number
of moviegoer steps of strategic thinking, and τd will be the mean number of distributor steps of
strategic thinking. The limiting result τd = τm =∞ implies both are best responding to each other
and is equivalent to quantal response equilibrium.
To determine QR parameters {λd, λm} and additional CH parameters {τd, τm}, we use an iter-
ative procedure for estimating values similar to the cursed equilibrium procedure. The procedure
is much easier, however, because level-k player behavior is determined by level-k-1 behavior. The
iteration is a “do loop” for specific λm, λd values, which is truncated at high levels of k (k > 40)
where the percentage of high level-k players is very small (which depends on τ ). Looping through
for various λm, λd makes it easy to then grid-search over the λ values and find best-fitting values
of both τ and λ.
Table A.5 shows the results of the iterative process for the CH model with QR. The process
stopped after six iterations with a log likelihood value of −166.2, which is a significant improve-
ment over the asymmetric cursed model (−205.7).42
Note that in the specification with identical values of mean thinking level τ , the estimated
value of τˆm = τˆd∗ = 1.12. This is lower than in many experimental studies (often 1-2) but is in the
41All Poisson distributions are determined by one parameter τ , which is both the mean and variance of the distribu-
tion. Thus τ is also the variance of the number of steps of strategic thinking.
42The value for λd (7.085) is also much greater than for the cursed equilibrium (λd=1.345), but this difference
reflects an unknown mixture of scale differences and differences in response sensitivity.
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Table 6: Comparison of the three behavioral models for moviegoer predictions with bootstrapped
standard errors (N = 100). The last column is the square root of the average of the squared
difference between actual box office (in millions $) and predicted box office (in millions $).
ballpark,43 of estimates from experimental games (τˆ ≈ 1.5)44 and for field data the initial week of
Swedish LUPI lotteries (τˆ = 2.98, O¨stling et al., (2007)) and managerial IT decisions (τˆ = 2.67,
Goldfarb and Yang (2007)). However, the common-τ estimation implies an average cold opening
box office premium of 35.7% (Table 6), which, like the estimate for the cursed model, is positive
but is much higher than the regression estimate.
43The objective function (sum of squared residuals) is rather flat in the vicinity of the best-fitting τm, so higher
values from 2–4 give comparable fits to τˆ∗m = 1.12. An ex ante prediction based on τ = 1.5 from lab data would
forecast reasonably well in this field setting.
44Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b) estimate a level-k model for auctions and hide-and-seek games respectively.
They do not use a single Poisson parameter, but most of their classifications are for level 1 thinkers and level 2 second
most, which would be most consistent with a Poisson parameter between 1–2.
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Table 7: Predictions of cold opening choices of distributors with bootstrapped standard errors
(N = 100). Each model provides a probability that a given movie will be cold opened. When
compared with actual data, there is a probability that the model would correctly predict all actual
decisions correct (log likelihood), an expected number of cold opening decisions the movie would
predict correctly (mean correct), and the standard deviation of the number that model would predict
correctly.
4.3 Comparing Distributor Estimation across Models
Table 8 provides standard error estimates from 100 random bootstraps of the data set for each pa-
rameter and each model. These bootstrapped samples are then used to give standard error estimates
for comparative statistics between the three models in Tables 6 and 7. Among other things, Table
8 indicates the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal response fits distributor decisions (in terms
of log likelihood) significantly better than the other models.
Another thing to note is that most of the cursed model bootstraps have a best-fitting χ value of
0. Thus the initial finding of common moviegoer curse and distributor expectation of moviegoer
curse at χˆ = 0 (equivalent to QRE) was not an aberration. However, standard errors indicate that
for a few bootstrapped estimates, the best fitting χ was not zero. For χm the estimates indicate a
high degree of curse with some variation.
Table 6 compares best-fitting parameter values in sums of squared residuals (for moviegoer
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Table 8: Parameter estimates of models with bootstrapped standard errors (N = 100).
Note: χ* denotes result where moviegoers’ curse and distributors’ beliefs about moviegoers are
the same.
decisions). The non-equilibrium cursed model predicts the box office revenues of cold opened
movies best in terms of deviations from actual data; the cognitive hierarchy model fits second best.
This is not surprising since both models predict a box office premium. Even a prediction that
moviegoers assume uniformly random quality to cold opened movies (all 0-level thinkers) fits the
data better than the rational alternative, QRE model, which assumes correct expectations for cold
opened quality.
For distributor decisions (Table 8) the best fitting equilibrium cursed parameter is zero, so the
cursed and rational alternative, QRE models perform identically (because with χ*= 0, the models
are equivalent). In cursed models, moviegoers and distributors are allowed to have non-Nash
expectations, but distributors are required to best respond to them. The results suggest that given
distributors must best respond to any degree of moviegoer curse, a model with moviegoers having
correct expectations of movie quality fits the data best (that is, no expected moviegoer curse would
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explain the data better).
The CH model improves a little bit on the predictions of the cursed model. The key to its rela-
tive success is that the model estimates a low τ for moviegoers (τˆm = 1.12, close to experimental
estimates of τ around 1.5–2.5) but the distributor τd is much higher (8.5). These parameters ex-
press the intuition that some moviegoers are easily fooled—they think cold openings are close to
random—but distributors do not think moviegoers are so easily fooled, which is the models way
of explaining why so few movies are cold-opened given the box office premium.
The CH model also predicts the most number of opening decisions correctly because its high
τd predicts very few movies will be cold opened the higher λd predicts some movies will be cold
opened because of noise. The bootstrapped standard errors show these results are reasonably robust
and do not depend on only a few data points. Importantly, the bootstrapped standard error around
the mean bootstrapped estimate τm = 1.120 is 0.121. This estimated τ for moviegoers is less
than the average steps of thinking value found in most experiments (1.5), but is not much less.
The estimate is also significantly different than random perception of quality (τd = 0) or fully
rational perception (τd → ∞). The large improvement in log likelihood compared to the cursed
model also suggests the CH model is a more reasonable overall explanation. All models are also
an improvement over the baseline case which predicts that all movies to be cold-opened with the
same probability (.07).
Finally, an entirely different explanation for the distributors’ behavior is that distributors do not
cold open enough because they are optimistic about their movie quality.45 For example, suppose
that they think moviegoers have no curse (i.e., χd = 0) but they think their movie’s quality is
45We thank Cade Massey for this insightful idea. Optimism has also been studied in economics by Camerer and
Lovallo (1999), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), and Mayraz (2008).
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a weighted average of its true quality and the top quality of 100. That is, Ed(qj) = 100ζd +
qj(1 − ζd). If we use this perceived quality in lieu of the true quality and repeat the analysis,
the best-fitting values are {λˆd, ζˆd} = {0.183, 0.283}. The associated log-likelihood is -175.057,
a substantial improvement over the no-optimism (ζ˜d = 0) fit of -204.20. So the combination of
rampant optimism– producers believing that their beloved movies are a quarter of the way from
how good they actually are to perfection– along with a faith in moviegoers’ rationality, is another
way to explain the distributors’ reluctance to cold-open movies.
5 Conclusion
In games where information about a single dimension of product quality is known to be good or
bad news, and may be strategically disclosed or withheld at no cost, the only equilibrium involves
the information receiver believing all withheld information conveys the worst possible news. Then
the information sender should always reveal all information (except the worst).
However, this equilibrium reasoning requires many steps of iterated strategic thinking. Numer-
ous laboratory experiments have shown in a variety of games that either noisy responses or a small
number of steps of strategic thinking tends to explain data well, as parameterized by cursed equi-
librium, and cognitive hierarchy (CH) approaches with stochastic better-response. These models
explain both experimental results that are far from equilibrium and other results that are surpris-
ingly close to equilibrium, even in one-shot games (e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2001; Camerer et al.,
2004).
This paper is the first to apply both parametrized behavioral models to a naturally occurring
field phenomenon, an example of “structural behavioral economics.” Field applications like these
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are important in showing whether principles of limited rationality that were inspired and calibrated
by experimental data can also explain some basic facts in larger-scale field settings (see DellaVi-
gna, 2007, for many examples).
We study a market in which information senders (movie distributors) are strategically with-
holding information (the quality of their movie) from information receivers (moviegoers), by not
showing movies to critics in time for reviews to be published before opening weekends. Contrary
to the simple Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, there is a “box office premium”—movies that have been
cold opened earn more than other pre-screened movies with similar characteristics. Importantly,
there is no such premium in foreign or video rental markets, where movies are released after the ini-
tial US release (so that reviews are widely available). The disappearance of the premium in rental
and overseas markets is consistent with the hypothesis that the premium is due to some moviego-
ers failing to realize that no advance review is a bad signal about quality. The fact that moviegoer
ratings (from imdb) are lower for these movies also suggests moviegoers’ overestimated expected
quality.
The cursed equilibrium model has difficulty explaining the box office premium (unless the
moviegoers’ curse and distributors’ perceptions are different). Both restricted models perform
poorly because moviegoers should correctly anticipate that cold opened movies are of low qual-
ity, which is inconsistent with the cold opening box office premium. The CH model with a low
number of thinking steps τm to represent moviegoer naı¨vete´, and a high τd to represent distributor
over-sophistication can represent the mismatch of moviegoer perceptions and the reluctance (given
expected moviegoer perceptions) of distributors to cold open.
The mismatch of parameter values for moviegoers and distributors suggest that either movie-
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Figure 2: Percent of widely-released movies cold opened by year, 2000–2007
goers should learn over time that cold opened movies are bad,46 or distributors should learn to cold
open more movies.
The time trend is consistent with the hypothesis that distributors are learning, because the
number of cold opening decisions increase across the years in the sample (Figure 2).47 The models
46A natural question is how fast consumers will eventually learn that cold opened movies have low quality. Eco-
nomic intuition and experiments on lemons (e.g. Lynch et al., 2001) suggest consumers will ultimately infer that goods
whose quality is not disclosed have low quality. However, movie audiences contain overlapping generations, so that
the relevant time frame for learning is the first few years in which teenagers go to the movies. In this time they may
only learn, with noise, from a few movies that they hear little about and are disappointed by. So it is conceivable that
there is a learning process but it is slow enough within a generation, and does not spill over across generations, to
permit the box office premium that we see in the data.
47Through 2000–2005 distributors cold opened around 5–8% of widely released movies. In 2006 and 2007 distrib-
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in this paper suggest that distributors should have cold opened more movies as a best-response to
limited strategic thinking by moviegoers. However, this speculation is severely limited by the fact
that over the time period we study there are substantial changes in movie economics (a shift from
live box office to DVD sales and rental) and information about movie quality (which leaks out in
advance more nowadays due to internet sites and blogs).
While the industry studied here, major movie distributors, is quite unique, the main parts of
the industry—products of unknown quality and critical review—are found in other industries. For
example, another market in which critical valuations are consumed by potential buyers is markets
for expensive artworks. Mei and Moses (2005) find that estimates of selling prices, released by
auction houses, are upward-biased estimates of later prices, but that investors seem to respond
to these prices, as if they do not fully discount the auctioneers’ incentives to inflate estimates.
Our approach could be utilized to determine the sophistication of these buyers and auctioneers.
The applications of this approach are much wider when one considers the similarity between cold
opening and the well-studied economic problem of selective disclosure.
Since this setting features producers choosing how much information about a dimension of
product quality that consumers value to disclose, it is similar to many other industries that feature
selective disclosure. In relation to this literature, our results suggest that some consumers do not
perfectly infer low quality from non-disclosure (i.e., from cold opening). Furthermore, the fact that
IMBD ratings are about 10% lower for movies that are cold opened suggests that consumers make
mistakes which they regret. However, these mistakes are small (based on the rating measures) and
distributors do disclose information (through reviews) about more than 90% of the movies, so this
utors cold opened 19% (30/160) and 23% (30/131).
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is a market in which voluntary disclosure is certainly working reasonably well.
Our results are similar to three other sharp field studies of consumer quality disclosure (Math-
ios, 2000; Jin and Leslie, 2003; Jin, 2005). All three studies are inconsistent with the strong hy-
pothesis that customer strategic thinking leads to complete voluntary disclosure, so that mandatory
disclosure will have no effect. Mathios (2000) studied nutrition labeling of salad dressing. Most
low-fat dressings (less than 9 grams of fat per serving) were voluntarily labelled for fat content be-
fore mandatory disclosure, while only 15% of high-fat dressings were labelled. After mandatory
disclosure, the share of the high-fat dressings fell by about 20%. This effect is consistent with the
hypothesis that some consumers did not infer that non-labeling implied high fat content, and the
mandatory disclosure provided information they had not inferred (but cared about). Jin and Leslie
(2003) studied the effects of a shift from voluntary to mandatory posting of standardized health-
rating cards in Los Angeles restaurants. They find that mandatory disclosure increases hygiene
scores by 5.3%, which is about half a standard deviation of the distribution, and which is modestly
significantly higher than under voluntary disclosure.48 Jin (2005) shows that HMOs do not vol-
untarily disclose quality (via NCQA accreditation) in markets that are the least competitive. She
also finds that HMOs which voluntarily disclose tend to serve areas with large employers, which
suggests that HMOs are responding differently when they have more sophisticated customers (be-
cause big firms tend to have more savvy benefits managers) than when they have less sophisticated
48Their test probably understates the effects of a shift from voluntary to mandatory disclosure because some of the
voluntary-disclosure cities were expected to adopt mandatory disclosure in the near future. Restaurants might have
begun complying early during the last parts of the voluntary regime, and earlier than they would have if they did not
expect a shift to mandatory disclosure. Since their test understates the change from voluntary to mandatory disclosure,
it therefore overstates the degree of consumer rationality.
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consumers.
Note, however, that our paper was not designed to pass judgment on the detailed concerns in
regulatory debates about disclosure. We simply note that the limits that we infer from consumer
(moviegoer) behavior on strategic thinking are comparable to conclusions drawn from the other
empirical studies that are more sharply focussed on effects of disclosure changes or choices.
Finally, we note again that there are many markets and political situations with asymmetric
information in which the failure to reveal information that could be revealed should be informative,
if the receiver makes the proper strategic inference, and yet information is often unrevealed. Our
approach could be applied to these situations.
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Appendices: Not for Publication
A Description of Variables
To determine if a movie was cold opened (cj = 1) we examined the dates on three or four major
news publications (the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and New
York Post). If the dates of reviews in any of these publications were later than the release date we
examined the reasoning behind the late reviews. A movie was classified a “cold open” if at least
one source stated the movie was not screened for critics before release (in most cases, none of the
available sources had advance reviews).
Weekend and total US box office data were obtained from a FilmSource database (Nielsen EDI,
www.filmsource.com). The FilmSource database also included the number of theaters that
showed a movie during its first weekend, the number of days in the opening weekend, and if the
movie was released before Friday (generally only for anticipated blockbusters). FilmSource also
gave a description of the genre of the movie, its MPAA rating (G, PG, PG-13, R), and whether the
movie was adapted from previous source material.
Production budget information came from imdb.com for most movies, and from boxoffice-
mojo.com or the-numbers.com for those missing from imdb.com. Budget data were available for
856 of the 890 movies, including 59 or the 62 cold openings (95%). Of this set, 832 movies also
had the first day’s box office data available on imdb.com including 59 of the 62 cold openings.
The imdb.com database was used to determine the star power rating of each movie’s stars. Each
week imdb.com determined this value by ranking the number of searches done on the imdb.com
site for every person affiliated with movies. The most searched star would have value 1. Since
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there are over one million stars on imdb.com, we took the natural logarithm of the star ranking to
reduce effect of unknown stars with very high numbers. We averaged the logged star ranking for
the top two stars for each movie during its opening week.
Three other variables, competition (the average production budget of other movies released on
the same opening weekend), the summer dummy variable (whether the movie was released in June,
July and August), and the year of release variable (2000=-3, 2001=-2, 2002=-1, 2003=0, 2004=1,
2005=2, 2006=3) were calculated from the previous data.49
B Supplemental Tables and Figures
Table A.1 shows the regressions done on logged opening day box office in the full and lean regres-
sions. Table A.2 shows regressions done on logged post-opening-weekend box office in the full
and lean regressions including logged opening weekend box office as a regressor. Table A.3 shows
the correlations between the regressors in the full regressions done on box office. Table A.4 shows
values after each iteration in estimating the cursed parameters with quantal response (QR). Table
A.5 shows values after each iteration in estimating the CH parameters with QR.
Figure A.1 shows the predicted probabilities of cold opening by critic quality and actual deci-
sion. About half the movies cold-opened (squares) have high predicted probabilities and half have
low probabilities. There is a clear relation between quality and the predicted probability of cold
opening. The model is on the right track but the correlation is far from perfect. Figure A.2 shows
the expected quality of each movie given it was cold opened vs. the actual quality. Since movie-
goers correctly infer expectations in the QRE, about half the cold opened movies have quality less
49The regressions had similar results when dummy variables for year were used instead of one year variable.
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Table A.1: Regressions of log open-
ing day revenues (in millions)
Table A.2: Regressions of log box of-
fice revenues after first weekend (in
millions)
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Table A.3: Correlation between variables
than their actual critic ratings. The low value of λd causes a wide variety of expectation values for
cold opened movies between 0 and 40.
Figure A.3 which represents the estimated probability that each movie will be cold opened,
with actual cold-openings plotted in red. The implied line from the scatter plot is much clearer
in Figure A.3 than in Figure A.1 for the QRE model. The cold opened movies on average have
higher probabilities of being cold opened, so the model fits better. Figure A.2 shows the estimated
value of the expected quality belief moviegoers would have if each movie had been cold opened.
This is almost a constant because of the relatively high λd and lower τm. Moviegoers expect few
cold opening decisions to be the result of quantal response, but they mostly expect distributors to
be best responding to 0 or 1 level moviegoers who do not associate quality with movies or the
decision to cold open. Note that cold opened movies (red squares) tend to have expected quality
above actual quality and screened movies have expected quality below actual quality. Tables A.6
and A.7 show the sum of squares and log likelihood for the various values of estimates of τd and
{τd, λd}, respectively.
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Table A.4: The iterative estimation process for the cursed equilibrium model with quantal response
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Table A.5: The iterative estimation process for the CH model with quantal response
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Figure A.1: Probability of movie being cold opened in QRE model by critic rating (λd = 1.345)
Figure A.2: Expected movie quality given it is cold opened in QRE model by critic rating (λd =
1.345)
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Table A.6: Average squared dif-
ference between predicted and ac-
tual weekend revenues (in $) for
all cold openings (N = 59) by
moviegoer sophistication in CH
model with QR (λd = 7.085)
Table A.7: Log likelihood for all distributor
release decisions (N = 856) in CH model
with QR by distributor sophistication
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Figure A.3: Probability of movie being cold opened in CH model with QR by critic rating (λ =
7.085, τd = 8.567)
Figure A.4: Expected movie quality given it is cold opened in CH model with QR by critic rating
(λ = 7.085, τd = 8.567)
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C Details of Iterative Estimation Procedures (QRE, Cursed,
CH)
This section provides the general iterative procedure for obtaining estimates for the relevant pa-
rameters of the QRE, cursed and CH models.
1. The iteration counter begins at i = 1.
2. The coefficients in equation 6 are estimated using a linear regression,
log
(
yj
Ntˆ− yj
)
= (−λmα)Em(qj|cj, Xj)− (λmβ)Xj − (λm)tˆ− (λm)j (15)
assuming N = 300 × 106 and tˆ = 5.34.50 In iteration i = 1 only the 797 movies which
are screened to critics (cj = 0) are used. Using assumption 1, the observed qj is substituted
for the unobserved expectation Em(qj|0, Xj) for these movies. Then all the independent and
dependent variables are measured and we can estimate the regression easily.51 In later iter-
ations, expected quality values
(
Eqremi (qj|cj, Xj) , Ecemi(qj|cj, Xj), orEchmi [Ek(qj|cj, Xj)|τd]
)
after iteration i will have been computed, and a regression on the full sample can be run.
3. Since simply using Rˆ(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = Ntˆ
(
1 + exp[λ̂mαEm(qj|cj, Xj) + λ̂mβXj + λ̂mtˆ]
)
to estimate R(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj) would produce biased estimates, non-parametric kernel re-
gression techniques are used. A consistent Gaussian kernel regression is used to estimate
50Results are highly similar for N = 100× 106, 200× 106, and tˆ = 5.34.
51A crucial maintained assumption below is that the coefficient on expected quality, α, in determining moviegoer
attendance, and hence revenue, is the same for known-quality (screened) and unknown-quality (cold opened) movies.
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revenue from the parameter estimates from equation 15.
Rˆ(Xj, Em(qj|cj, Xj)) = mˆ
(−λm(αEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βXj − tˆ))
=
∑
l∈Ji Kh(g(j)− g(l))yl∑
l∈Ji Kh(g(j)− g(l))
(16)
where g(j) = −λ̂m
(
αˆEm(qj|cj, Xj) + βˆXj − tˆ
)
, and K is the Gaussian kernel, Kh(x) =
h 1√
2pi
e
x
2h , with bandwidth, h = 0.9w‖Ji‖−1/5 where w = min(sy, IQRy/1.34) (from Sil-
verman, 1986) and Ji is the current iteration’s set of movies (with length 797 for iteration 1,
856 thereafter).
4. The regression results from step 2 give iteration-i coefficients αˆi and βˆi and a response sen-
sitivity λˆm,i. Step 3 gives estimated revenue equation Rˆi from these parameters for different
values of Xj and qj . From equation (3) we have
Eqrem (qj|Xj, 1) =
P100
q=0 qpi(Xj ,q)P (q)P100
q=0 pi(Xj ,q)P (q)
⇒ Eqrem (qj|Xj, 1)
∑100
q=0 pi (Xj, q)P (q) =
∑100
q=0 qpi (Xj, q)P (q)
⇒∑100q=0 pi (Xj, q)P (q) [Eqrem (qj|Xj, 1)− q] = 0
⇒
P100
q=0 P (q)[E
qre
m (qj |Xj ,1)−q]
1+exp(λd(Rˆ(Xj ,Eqrem (qj |Xj ,1))−Rˆ(Xj ,qj)))
= 0
(17)
where the last step follows from the definition of pi(Xj, q) (assumption 3). All the terms
in 17 can be estimated from regression coefficients (αˆi, βˆi, λˆm,i from step 2), determined
from the revenue equation Rˆi (from step 3), fit from the quality distribution P (q), or fixed
by assumption (tˆ, N), except for λd and Eqremi (qj|Xj, 1). To create an iteration of estimates of
Eqrem (qj|Xj, 1) ∀j we fix a value of λd and solve 17 for each movie j. Next, using fixed λd,
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and newly calculated estimates of Eqremi (qj|Xj, 1) for each movie, along with the estimated
parameters in step 2 and revenue equations in step 3, the predicted iteration-i probability
(pˆii(Xj, qj, λd)) that each movie j will be cold opened can be computed from assumption 3.
Additionally, in the cursed procedure: For any fixed χd, the newly calculated estimates of
Eqrem (qj|Xj, 1) (see above equation 17) for each movie can be converted to Ecem(qj|Xj, 1), by
equation 3. With those values, along with the estimated parameters in step 2 and revenue
equations in step 3, the predicted iteration-i probability (pˆii(Xj, qj, λd) that each movie j will
be cold opened can be computed from assumption 3 for each value of χd.
The CH procedure obtains the probabilities that each movie is cold opened differently:
For a given λd and τd, we use our estimated values αˆi, βˆi, λˆm,i, and estimated revenue
equation Rˆi to estimate piki(qj, Xj), Eki(q|Xj, 1), and Rˆi(Ek(q|Xj, 1)) for k = 0 . . . k¯ using
equations 9–12.52 Since the probability of a given distributor being level k is P (x = n|d) =
τnd e
−τ/n! and the probability of that distributor cold opening given he is level k is pik(qj, Xj),
the total probability that a movie is cold opened is
pˆii(Xj, qj, λd, τd) =
k¯∑
k=0
pik(qj, Xj)× τnd e−τ/n! (18)
5. Step 4 is performed repeatedly for a grid search over sets of values of λd ∈ Ai (or (λd, χd) ∈
{Ai, B}, (λd, τd) ∈ {Ai, Bi}), where the grid search becomes progressively finer across
52We used k¯ = 40, because given regular τ values the probability of k > 40 is nearly zero.
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iterations i.53
The maximum likelihood estimate ω (λ∗d,i, (λ
∗
d, χ
∗
d), or (λ
∗
d, τd)) is chosen from the set Ωi
(Ai, {Ai, B}, or {Ai, Bi}).54 That value satisfies
ω∗i = argmax
ω∈Ωi
L(ω)
= argmax
ωi∈Ωi
∏
j
[pˆii (Xj, qj, ω) cj × (1− pˆii (Xj, qj, ω)) (1− cj)] (19)
where L(ω) is the joint probability that distributors would choose to screen and cold open
each of the 856 movies in the exact manner they did under the QRE (or cursed, CH) model
with parameter(s) ω.55
6. The value for the maximum likelihood parameter λ∗d,i determined from the last step 6 is then
53The initial λd,i grid is A1 = {1, 1.25, ..., 2}. The second grid A2 takes an interval of values in increments of .1
around the maximum likelihood estimate λ∗d,1. The next grids Ai take on values of values of width .05, 0.01, 0.005,
and 0.001 around the maximum likelihood estimate λ∗d,i−1.
For cursed: The initial λd,i grid isA1 = {1, 1.25, ...2}. The second gridA2 takes an interval of values in increments
of .1 around the maximum likelihood estimate λ∗d,1. The next grids Ai take on values of values of width .05, 0.01,
0.005 and 0.001, around the maximum likelihood estimate λ∗d,i−1. The grid for χd, B is always {0,0.005,...1}.
For CH: The initial λd,i grid is A1 = {1, 2, ..., 10} and τd,i grid is B1 = {0.05, 0.1, ..., 10}. The second grid A2
takes an interval of values in increments of .1 around the maximum likelihood estimate λ∗d,1. The next grids Ai take
on values of values of width .05, 0.01, 0.005 and 0.001, around the maximum likelihood estimate λ∗d,i−1. For grids
i ≥ 2, Bi = 8.001, ...9.
54In the early steps of iteration (i.e., steps 1–3) this value is determined by interpolating inside the grid to achieve
more decimal precision.
55This process takes roughly 15 minutes (8 minutes for CH) for each λd on a single PC running Mathematica 5.2.
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used in equation 17 to solve for iteration-i values of Eqremi (qj|cj, Xj) for each of the 59 cold
opened movies.
For the CH procedure: The maximum likelihood value λ∗d,i is used to compute the population-
averaged expectation for each of the 59 cold opened movies in the sample with
E[Ek(q|Xj, 1)|τm] =
m¯∑
k=0
pik(qj, Xj)Ek(q|Xj, 1). (20)
The value of τm that minimizes the squared residuals in equation 6 is considered the best
estimator for this step, that is
τ ∗m,i = argmin
τm
∑
j:cj=1
(
Rˆi (Xj, E [(Ek(q|Xj, 1)|τm])− yj
)2
(21)
where Rˆi(...) is estimated from the kernel estimation 15 in step 2.
Now we have a full set of quality measures qj and expected qualities for every movie.
7. The process is stopped when the regression values and parameter estimates (λ∗m, ω
∗
m) from
the current iteration i are all within .001 of those from iteration i−1. Otherwise, the process
is repeated with the iteration counter increased by one, starting with the regression step 2.
For the cursed procedure: When the process converges, a new value χm is calculated to
minimize the sum of squares between predicted and actual values over all cold openings.
That value is determined by
χ∗m = argmin
χm
∑
j:cj=1
(
Rˆ (Xj, (1− χm)Ere∗m (q|Xj, 1) + χmq¯)− yj
)2
(22)
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where Rˆ(...) is the last estimate done in step 3.
8. The process is repeated 100 more times with different bootstrapped data sets. A bootstrapped
data set is created by randomly sampling with replacement from the 856 movies in the orig-
inal data set. Parameter estimates are obtained by repeating steps 1–7. Standard errors (see
Table 8) are calculated by taking the standard deviation of these 100 parameter estimates.56
56Depending on the bootstrap and number of iterations, the process for a single bootstrap takes 2–6 hours for QRE
(2–6 for cursed, 2–12 for CH) on a single PC running Mathematica 5.2
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